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The Clinton/Gore proposal for the creation of a network of 100 community
development banks (CDBs) to revitalize communities is bold, and will contribute to
the success of the U.S. economy. Banks are essential institutions in any community,
and the establishment of a bank is often a prerequisite for the investment process. For
this reason, the creation of banks in communities lacking such institutions is
important to the welfare of these communities.
The vitality of the American economy depends on the continual creation of new and
initially small firms. Because it is in the public interest to foster the creation of new
entrants into industry, trade, and finance, it is also in the public interest to have a set
of strong, independent, profit-seeking banking institutions that specialize in financing
smaller businesses.
When market forces fail to provide a service that is needed and potentially profitable,
it is appropriate for government to help create the market. Community development
banks fall into such a category. They do not require a government subsidy, and after
start-up costs, the banks are expected to be profitable.
The primary perspective of this concept paper is that the main function of the
financial structure is to advance the capital development of the economy-to increase
the real productive capacity and wealth-producing ability of the economy. Thesecond assumption is that capital development is encouraged by the provision of a
broad range of financial services to various segments of the U.S. economy, including
consumers, small and large businesses, retailers, developers, and all levels of
government. The third is that the existing financial structure is particularly weak in
servicing small and start-up businesses, and in servicing certain consumer groups.
The fourth is that this problem has become more acute because of a decrease in the
number of independent financing alternatives and a rise in the size distribution of
financing sources, which have increased the financial system’s bias toward larger
transactions. These are assumptions that appear to be supported by the evidence:
they are also incorporated in other proposals that advance programs to develop
community development banking.
II. Rationale for Community Development Banks
The greatest danger to the community bank concept may be a lack of clarity in the
concept. The primary goals of the CDBs are to deliver credit, payment, and savings
opportunities to communities not well served by banks, and to provide financing
throughout a designated area for businesses too small to attract the interest of the
investment banking and normal commercial banking communities.
The community service aspects of the banks involve the payment mechanism and the
savings facility. These require none of the “underwriting and judgment” skills of thebanker who takes risks. An assumption underlying the lack of credit facilities
assertion is that there are “bankable risks” and feasible “equity investments” in
distressed and less stressed communities that involve dollar amounts too small for
the established banking community. Even “small” commercial banks customarily
handle asset and liability denominations that are larger than those typically generated
in low income communities.
There are six identifiable banking functions:
1. Payment system for check cashing and clearing, and credit and debit cards.
2. Secure depositories for savings and transaction balances.
3. Household financing for housing, consumer debts, and student loans.
4. Commercial banking services for loans, payroll services, and advice.
5. Investment banking services for determining the appropriate liability
structure for the assets of a firm, and placing these liabilities.
6. Asset management and advice for households.
This list is not meant to imply that every bank should perform all of these functions.
The argument for community development banks is that one or more of the above
functions is not being adequately performed by existing institutions for well-defined
segments of the population: low-income citizens; inner-city minorities; and
entrepreneurs who seek modest financing for small businesses. Furthermore, this
troubling situation has been aggravated by a variety of problems that financial
institutions of all kinds have faced over the past years.The 1980s and 1990s have seen a decline in the number of independent financing
outlets for businesses, and a shift in the size distribution of banks and savings and
loan institutions in favor of larger banks. Banks now find it increasingly unprofitable
to serve many parts of the population, particularly the smallest enterprises. Our
proposal would increase the supply of short-term credit to small business.
One aim of the CDBs should be to seek out projects that promise to be profitable but
are not being financed because of their small size, their perceived riskiness, or the
“inexperience” of the prospective management. Theory and evidence suggest that
commercial banks are reluctant to make loans to firms that have not already
established close relations with a loan officer. Thus, firms that have been denied
access to credit due to perceived inexperience find it difficult to establish the required
ties. This problem is aggravated when the firms are small and, hence, lack market
power.
The objective of the CDB is to be profitable, and it will be as successful as the
projects it finances are profitable: this will dictate close supervision of its customers.
Government seed money may be involved, but the government’s investment in the
CDB system should be viewed as a profit-making investment. Thus, if the Congress
mandates subsidized financing by these banks, the Congress should budget the
expected cost of the mandated spending as a subsidy to the endeavor.Capital development of the country in general and of depressed regions in particular
requires a broad range of financial services in order to raise effective demand and
revitalize the regional and national economies. In other words, “capital development”
is the primary concern, but this does not solely mean the provision of investment
finance. The whole community needs financial reform: this includes the provision of
financial services to all segments of the economy, including consumers, small and
large business, retailers, developers, and all levels of government. The CDB proposal
will address most of these; it will ignore finance of big business and of federal and
state government. However, we need to emphasize that the CDB proposal cannot, by
itself, be viewed as the panacea that will solve all of the problems afflicting
economically depressed communities.
III. Assessment of Community Development Bank Experience
The existing models of CDBs provide a useful starting point for the development of a
nationwide strategy. However, we believe that there are significant problems with
existing CDBs (and with proposals based on these). Consequently, we do not
recommend that these models be applied as part of a nationwide strategy.
Community development banks have been successful when they have been able to
attract deposits from outside the community while using the funds for residential
mortgage loans. The most successful community development bank, and the oldest, is
the Shorebank Corporation of Chicago, a holding company that includes a bank, areal estate development corporation, a small venture capital firm, and the
Neighborhood Institute, which offers among its services low-income-housing
development, remedial education, and vocational training. On the asset side, its
greatest success has been residential mortgages, typically made on the condition that
the structures be renovated and improved. The loan loss ratio at Shorebank in 1990
was 0.46% and in 1991 was 0.67%. The key to its success is residential housing: as
Ronald Grzywinski of Shorebank acknowledged, “the principal small business of
Shorebank was quite simply housing.”
The other CDB commonly referred to as a potential model is the Southern
Development Bancorporation, parent of Elk Horn Bank & Trust Company in
Arkansas. It uses a subsidiary called the Good Faith Fund, which offers loans from
$500 to a few thousand dollars to low-income people trying to start a business. The
activities in small-business loans have been less successful, as have attempts to
provide low-cost checking and savings deposits for the community residents.
On the liability side of the balance sheet, the most important innovation of Shorebank
has been Development Deposits, funds gathered from outside the community, from
institutions and individuals who share the goals of the corporation. Presently,
development certificates of deposit account for almost half of the deposit base at
Shorebank. Some depositors accept below-market rates to subsidize Shorebank’s
work, but generally these deposits offer market rates of interest. Rehabilitation
certificates of deposit, which typically pay 200 basis points below the market interestrates, make up 4.1% of Shorebank’s deposits. Thus, the banks are subsidized to some
extent by philanthropists and socially conscious people who are willing to accept a
lower rate of return on their money in exchange for doing something they consider
an important contribution to society. This asset/liability structure, which also carries
federal deposit insurance, has been the key to the success of the corporation.
Shorebank’s principal weakness is that, although it pays for itself, it is not profitable
enough to convince other entrepreneurs with capital to imitate its success; its returns
to its owners have been lower than average for a bank its size. Thus, it should not
serve as a model for a nationwide system of CDBs.
IV. Potential Problems with a Nationwide Strategy
The strengths of existing community development banks may turn out to be
weaknesses if current policy is followed as a national strategy. Attracting funds from
the outside is important for particular CDBs, but to establish a nationwide group of
banks and then expect them to compete for funds from the “socially conscious”
public would be self-defeating. It is not a viable long-run strategy to promote as a
national policy the transfer, for example, of the “socially conscious” funds of New
York City to rural Alabama (or vice versa). A national policy should encourage local
markets for the CDB liabilities just as it encourages local markets for the CDB assets.
This will help to ensure that local consumers receive the broad range of financialservices needed to encourage capital development of the community, particularly
credit services and transaction services. The banks of a nationwide system of CDBs
cannot rely on local short-term loans as a primary asset while the primary liabilities
are external funds because this ignores the payment and saving functions of the local
community.
A key aspect of Shorebank is that its neighborhood was still perhaps two-thirds
middle and working class when the bank came into existence. CDB managers do not
claim that their model would work in the very worst ghettos. A strategy based on
existing models would, therefore, neglect those at the very bottom of the economic
ladder, who presumably need the most help. Reliance on <external funds ignores the
necessary provision of bank services to local consumers. This is why we believe that
a CDB should be restricted to providing financial services in the community.
Another important factor is that the existing CDBs, because they are unique in their
communities, face little competition for their core business. When they do face
competition, they often do well, especially in residential loans. Shorebank discovered
that its creation of the rehabilitation loan generated a demand from consumers for
other banks to also provide rehabilitation loans. This is an example of the market
working to the benefit of both business and consumer. However, in a nationwide
system, existing banks (under pressure of competition) can be expected to respond
and provide competition for the CDBs.Because the CDBs are not intended to be welfare programs but to provide services to
the community’s residents, they must meet the long-run market tests of profitability.
Aside from the service aspect, community development banks will improve the
well-being of our citizens by increasing opportunities directly for potential
entrepreneurs and for potential employees. The basic assumption underlying the
community development bank is that all areas of the country need banks that are
clearly oriented toward the small deal: households that have a small net worth; a
small IRA account; a small transactions account; and businesses that need financing
measured in thousands rather than millions or billions of dollars.
V. A Proposal for a Nationwide System of Community Development Banks
Our proposal deviates from existing examples of CDB-type banks, and from other
proposals, by emphasizing the need for the development of an equitable payment
system for the bottom quintile of the population, which is generally denied access to
checking accounts or credit cards. More attention should be given to this payment
function of banking. Others have argued that commercial banks should be required
to provide “life-line accounts.” We believe that this represents an unnecessary cost
that commercial banks can ill afford at the present time.
But by the same token, we recognize that it is important to bring the bottom quintile
of the population into the banking system without burdening them with excessivecosts associated with a “fee for services” payment mechanism. The current credit card
system, one example of a fee for services system, forces those who cannot get credit
cards (mainly those with lower incomes) to bear the burden of the vendor’s discount
to subsidize the purchasers who do have credit cards: in general, there is no discount
for payment by cash. The current checking component of the payment system is too
expensive for commercial banks to provide the small accounts needed by those with
low incomes, and thus cannot serve as the basis of a universal payment system
available to all. The CDB system, however, can be designed so that a profitable
payment system is incorporated within the package of services provided to the
community.
We would expect that a fully funded and mature CDB would provide many of the
six functions of banking outline above. However, these functions may be
implemented in phases, The payment system, secure outlets for savings, short-term
commercial loans, mortgage loans, and student loans should be included in the initial
phase. Investment-type banking services and asset management and advice for
households could be added later. If the demonstration project (which begins with 100
CDBs) proves successful, we anticipate the creation of a nationwide system of CDBs
that could provide all six banking functions in selected communities (as each CDB
finds its niche).
The CDB should rely to a great extent on local markets for its liabilities-this is the
inherent juxtaposition with the provision of small commercial loans. This is incontrast to existing CDBs, which rely on funds from outside of their communities.
First, reliance on external sources of funds conflicts with the goal of bringing the
populations of depressed areas into the banking system. Second, there is some
evidence that reliance on external, brokered money may have contributed to the thrift
crisis (brokered money is volatile, and it allowed some thrifts to grow too quickly).
Instead, a maximum limit (e.g., 10%) should be set for external funds. This will help
to ensure that local consumers receive the broad range of financial services needed to
encourage capital development of the community. The depressed areas are great
sources of funds (social security checks, welfare payments, earnings, private pensions,
and so on), but these have been flowing into megabanks that use them elsewhere.
Both the assets and the liabilities of the CDBs should be regionally restricted. Thus,
CDBs should be permitted to hold no more than perhaps 10% of their assets in the
form of liabilities that originate outside the community. These would likely consist
primarily of federal government bonds. Local government obligations would also
form part of the CDB’s portfolio. The result will be a mechanism to provide a source
of funding to the local community.
Creation of a Federal Bank for Community Development Banks
The funding, regulation, and supervision of CDBs can be carried out most effectively
by the creation of a federal bank for CDBs. The Federal Bank for Community
Development Banks (FBCDB) will be the central bank, the correspondent bank, thelink with financial markets, the supervising authority for the community
development banks, and it may provide some clearing services. It will provide up to
50% of the equity for the community development banks, and as an investor will
have access to the books of these banks. This FBCDB will also have responsibility for
the development of the professional staff of the CDBs. This would include training of
staff, provision of information, testing of competency, and so on.
The Federal Bank for Community Development Banks will be where the community
banks hold their reserve and their operating deposits. It will be the correspondent
bank for the community development banks--that is, the FBCDB would help finance
positions in assets, and, in some cases, would take shares in deals arranged by the
CDBs. The “checks” that the community bank makes available to the holders of
savings deposits may well be negotiable orders of withdrawal drawn on the Federal
Bank.
As the community development banks develop a mortgage business, the Federal
Bank would be the agency that securitizes these instruments.
The Federal Bank will be responsible for establishing and maintaining underwriting
standards for the community development banks. It will have a training
responsibility for the community banks, and be the link by which the mortgages
initiated by the community banks enter financial markets. Its oversight functions will
exist by the right of its position as an owner.The Federal Bank for Community Development Banks will be started with an initial
investment of $1 billion by the Congress, which could be augmented to $5 billion as,
and if the system warrants. It will report to the Congress. Its directors and its chief
executive officer will be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. It
will have an initial ability to borrow up to twice the federal government investment
in the market. The bank is designed to be profitable once the start-up period is over.
For clearing purposes, this bank will become a member of the Federal Reserve
System, although some clearing services may be provided by the FBCDB itself. The
FBCDB will match up to $10 million of private investment in each CDB. Because the
FBCDB is a major investor in each CDB, it will have representation on each board,
and as a co-investor will automatically have the right to inspect the books of the
CDBs. Finally, if necessary, the FBCDB will have access to the Fed’s discount window
to obtain reserves required in check clearing between the CDB system and the
commercial bank system. In short, the FBCDB will combine the functions of a central
bank, a correspondent bank, and an investor for the CDBs.
The Payment System and Secure Outlets for Savings
Every payment system involves the use of resources and, therefore, involves costs in
operating the payment system. These costs have to be borne by some sector of the
economy. Access to a payment system may require an ability to pay for the services
used. The payment system has evolved into a three-part structure: deposits subject to
check; debit and credit cards; and currency and coin. The deposit subject to checkpayment system is expensive and relatively inefficient. To realize how inefficient our
check payment system is, one need simply trace the flow of bills and payments
through the banking system and note the number of records that are needed by the
flow of payments and orders.
The costs of operating the checking system have been borne in a variety of ways.
Non-par clearing, where someone depositing or cashing a check received less than
the face value of the check under transaction, was a common practice for non-local
checks prior to the Great Depression. In recent years, the costs of the checking system
were borne by the difference between the interest paid on deposits and the interest
earned on bank assets, where access to the system without explicit service charges
depended on the size of the deposit balance. In addition, the Federal Reserve
operates a check-clearing service which in effect subsidizes the checking system. Over
the years, the checking system’s penetration grew, especially after the Savings and
Loan Associations and the other varieties of savings banks began to have deposits
that were subject to check (although coverage and access were never universal).
Commercial banks are restricting access to checking accounts by setting higher
minimum balances, offering minimal customer relations, and leveling explicit charges
for account activity. The result is that larger segments of the population are now
outside the check-using system than hitherto, and this trend of diminishing coverage
by the check system can be expected to continue. [This is implied by the recent workof John Caskey, forthcoming in a publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City].
In contrast to the now increasingly overt costs of a checking account, the costs of
credit-debit card systems are carried by an annual fee and a covert cost to the user in
the form of the vendor’s discount. (The payment aspect of the credit card should be
distinguished from the credit aspect.) Furthermore, of the three payment systems,
only the credit-debit card system is capable of being fully electronic: with a “smart’
cash register, the “paper” that is signed never leaves the place of origin unless a
charge is challenged. There is little doubt that an electronic plus plastic payment
system will be of increasing importance in the total payment system. The losses that
banks and other issuers of credit cards have taken in the current recession have led to
closer scrutiny, resulting in a restriction of access to the credit-debit card payment
mechanism.
For many communities, the only available banking services are those that are
performed by the currency exchanges. These exchanges are a “fee for services bank,”
which cashes checks and provides payment services (e.g. money orders) in exchange
for currency (charging a 2-4% fee for their services). In some jurisdictions, the
currency exchanges are allowed to receive welfare and social security checks. The
currency exchanges show that the fee schedule for making the exchange between
currency and checking forms of money can make the institution profitable. The
situation was aptly described by President Clinton:“One community leader in Los Angeles told me that in that vast place we know as
the inner city, there were 177 check-cashing stands in the neighborhood where the
riots began and only thirty-three banks. In the Washington, D.C., area, there are fifty
major banks but only two have branches in Anacostia and neither of them has a
lending office.”
The currency-exchange business should be one facet of the community development
banks. A recognition by the government that it is the payer’s responsibility to pay its
debts in a money form that the recipient can use implies that the government needs
to absorb the charges levied on recipients of its checks for the exchange of checks for
currency. This may require a payment by the government of 1% of the face value to
the CDBs that convert government checks into currency. To reduce payment system
costs, government payments could be made directly to accounts at CDBs by wire
transfers.
If the now-existing currency exchanges were licensed to accept savings accounts, and
if they were required to hold only short-term government securities as assets for
these accounts, they would be a savings equivalent of a narrow bank. Because their
assets would be restricted to short-term government bonds, these narrow banks could
carry a 100% federal government guarantee on their deposits regardless of the size of
any deposit, without paying deposit insurance premia to an agency such as the FDIC.These “narrow banks for savings” would solve the problem of the non-par exchanges
for some of the recipients of government checks. The deposit of government checks
into these accounts could well be an electronic transfer. The CDBs would offer
savings accounts that accept automatic deposits and allow a limited number of
withdrawals per month without explicit charges. This would become a feasible way
of offsetting the lack of elementary household banking services in poor
neighborhoods. In addition, the savings facility might allow a limited number of free,
negotiable orders of withdrawal to be written against these deposits; the rest would
carry a service charge.
In order to protect against interest-rate risk, a 2.5% equity against such deposits may
be required. (Even if a vast majority of the assets are short-term government
securities, both the interest rate and default risk are minimal.) The interest rate that
these banks pay on their liabilities will be keyed to the interest rate earned on the
portfolio: we calculate that a 0.5 to 0.75% differential would make the savings facility
profitable.
The check-cashing and savings facility dimensions of the community development
banks cover the services to poorer households functions which these banks are
designed to perform. The NOW accounts would eliminate the relatively substantial
payment system costs incurred by the poorest members of the community; low
income residents would be integrated into the banking system, and it would be the
first point of contact with a population in which we wish to encourage thrift.Financing Housing and Consumer Debt
The community development banks will act as mortgage originators within their
community. They will not engage in construction loans through this department. The
mortgages will be on homes and minor community-level commercial property. In
many cases, mortgage loans will include provisions for rehabilitation of property.
Those mortgages that are carried will be funded by long-term certificates of deposit
through the commercial bank subsidiary of the CDB, but as the banks develop it
should be possible to securitize such mortgages by way of facilities that the Federal
Bank for Community Development Banks will develop.
The consumer debt facilities that are available in prosperous communities are
generally not available in the communities in which the development banks will
function. The community development banks will be able to make credit cards
available to those who have built up a savings account. The CDBs may provide
student loans and other loans for investment in human capital.
Commercial Banking Services
The CDBs will provide commercial loan services for their clients. These loans will be
financed by demand deposits, certificates of deposit, and other types of deposits thatwill carry the ordinary deposit insurance. The development and solicitation of
business, the structuring of loans, and the supervision of credits are three essential
aspects of commercial banking. The bank’s staff for commercial banking consists of
business development and loan officers. In smaller banks, these two functions may be
combined, and the top management is likely to be the key business development
agent.
The business development officers of a bank are just what the name indicates: they
are the salespeople of the bank’s services to the business community. Like all
salespeople, they work a territory. A community, even if it is under-banked, has
going businesses. The calling program of the business development officers of a
community development bank will necessarily include the existing businesses in its
neighborhood, whose needs will be explored. The question of how the bank can serve
the existing businesses, not perhaps as the sole bank but as a supplement to existing
banking connections, will be on the “agenda” of the business development officer.
Being devoted to the community in which the businesses they are financing function,
the community development bank will, over time, develop a better awareness of the
potential successes and failures in their community than is available to the branch
officers of the larger traditional bank located outside the community.
The structure of a financing agreement is what is finalized in the contract: a bank’s
customer promises to pay money at future dates in exchange for being financed